A friend of mine who is currently attending Westminster Theological Seminary (East) recently called me to talk about getting some of his ideas out into the market place. Below is an article that has be on my rctr.org site for sometime (kind of hidden). Hopefully he will be passing some other writing(s) on to me to post. If you have comments, post them and I’ll let him know they are there.
“Ethics Without God: A Critique” by Ozzie Osgood
In “Ethics Without God,” Frank R. Zindler attempts to establish an ethical system to the exclusion of God by addressing the nature of the rules that govern human behavior, and from the nature of these rules develop a corresponding normative principle. Zindler argues that the current human condition is the result of evolutionary processes that have equipped the human nervous system with two characteristics, “emotional suggestibility” and “attachment imprintability.”`(1) The fact of moral deviance is explained to be the result of an evolutionary period in which human genetic material was unable to evolve rapid enough in a world of “great climactic flux.” (2) Learned behavior and culture became the means by which humans could survive in a world of such rapid evolution. In light of these factors, Zindler encourages his readers to act upon the “Enlightened Self-Interest” (3) principle through cooperation, justice, and reciprocity and through seeking and creating beauty in all its forms. Despite his attempt to form a consistent model for morality it is evident the Zindler’s commitment to the impersonal forces of nature to the exclusion of God has left him undermining the very moral system he seeks to promote leaving his Godless ethic in ultimate irrationality.
Foundational to Zindler’s position is the work of nature and evolution in shaping our moral behavior and tendencies. His two major tenets of human behavior, suggestibility and imprintability, are said to have been provided to us by nature. He writes, “Our sociality is the result of evolution, not choice… It is our nature…Nature also has provided…evolution has equipped.” (4) For Zindler, who we are and who we will be as moral creatures is the result of impersonal and mechanistic laws of nature. It is in reference to these laws that he writes, “The behavior of the Atheist is subject to the same rules of sociology, psychology, and neurophysiology that govern the behavior of all members of our species, religionists included.” (5) It is not that behavior has been, or is influenced by, external forces but that such forces “govern” behavior. Elsewhere, Zindler has professed such a belief in determinism, “I go beyond that (behaviorist psychology) because I understand that all behavior is chemically determined.” (6) At this level human behavior is the result of deterministic laws of matter in motion and chemical reactions.
However, it seems that human freedom is the presupposition of Zindler’s attempt at moral discussion. The uses of normative claims and implications are essential to Zindler’s discussion, “We cannot base our moral code upon arbitrary and capricious fiats…Our ethics must be firmly planted in the soil of scientific self-knowledge…They must be improvable and adaptable” (7) and “we will usually be wise to choose behaviors which will make others happy…” ( 
What are we to make of these claims? Are we to choose to accept his claims? Are we to choose to plant our ethics in the soil of scientific self-knowledge? Are we to choose behavior that produces happiness in others? It seems that Zindler is smuggling in a presupposition of freedom with these normative claims. The fact of this smuggling is evident in the inconsistency between normative/moral discussion and chemical determinism.
What role does moral discussion have in a mechanistic and chemically determined universe? Generally, normative claims are given to inform people as to how they should act to the end that they might act in such a manner. If such claims are not accepted then it becomes necessary to give subsequent reasons why they should be followed. So when Zindler writes, “Our ethics must be firmly planted in the soil of scientific self knowledge,” (9) he is calling the reader to accept and act upon this claim. His essay is a discussion of why this should be the case - because we are social animals, because we are immprintable etc. If all behavior is chemically determined then the behavior of acceptance and action are chemically determined. What then is the role for this normative claim and subsequent reasons? If Zindler is to be consistent, then the claim and reasons function as a stimulus to my brain that may or may not cause a chemical reaction that causes me to accept and act upon his claim. In either event, the acceptance or denial of his claim is not a free cognitive assent on my part to conditions that correspond to the way things are in the world but are merely chemical responses of some part of me. In other words, it is irrelevant whether or not ethics really should be based on science, religion, or even cartoons because our brain states are the result of mass series of stimulus response chemical reactions. The only thing that matters is how effective Zindler’s predetermined chemical reactions/brain states are in producing a reaction in our brain states. We are then left then with the epistemological dilemma of not being able to know how the world really is or how we are to really act. In other words, there is no relationship between us and a moral principle, there is only a relationship between Zindler’s chemical reactions and my chemical reactions. Chemical determinism destroys moral discussion by rendering real moral principles ultimately irrational.
Furthermore, if the only thing that matters in moral discussion is how effective Zindler’s predetermined brain states are at producing reactions in my predetermined brain states then we are in the epistemological dilemma of having no knowledge of a moral principle to govern the efforts of anyone who’s chemical states seeks to produce a reaction to our chemical states. We need not ponder too deep to find some creative and, what we would consider, immoral ways of creating this effect. Why is it that Zindler gives normative claims and reasons for them if there is no freedom to evaluate, accept, or deny his claims? Surely there are some more effective ways of producing results in those he wishes to convert than to write claims and give reasons. Chemical determinism leads to the destruction of moral discussion by rendering morality ultimately relative to the potency of one’s brains states. Wherein lies absolute relativism lies the silence of moral discussion.
The objection may be raised that even if freedom is a reality the Christian view of morality is not exempt from the tension between determinism and freedom since it incorporates God who is sovereign and humans who are free and responsible. Does not the Christian simply substitute God for what Zindler calls nature? If this is the case then it seems that Christians are very much in the same dilemma as Zindler. However, upon further reflection on the human epistemic condition we can find that the two views are radically different.
According to Zindler’s evolutionary view, human beings are part of, and governed by, a grand impersonal process of natural selection in which there is only matter in motion. As human beings we are composed of these impersonal laws at work with our molecular structure and we can never escape this predicament, even in our reasoning. So when we attempt to reconcile the tension between determinism and freedom we do so epistemologically confined to impersonal laws. We go into the world looking for answers but our methods, work, and the results of our investigation are all determined by these laws. If we surgically probe into the human brain to find freedom we will only find more matter that is subject to the impersonal laws of the universe. If some concept of freedom is formulated, then it cannot be known to correspond with the way the world really is because our act of probing and formulating may be the product of chemical reactions caused by stimuli that may exist entirely independent of the relationship between freedom and determinism as it exists in the real world. Once we have treaded the path of chemical determinism, apart from God, we are forever epistemological sealed from a rational understanding of the relationship between freedom and determinism.
Furthermore, any attempt to find freedom in the midst of the impersonal matter in motion involves implementing a “nomological dangler.” (10) All that we understand of the physical world and interaction we understand to be causal - my hand causes the cup to move, the suns gravitational pull causes the planets to orbit. In a physical, mechanist world things take place causally. So it can be understood why Zindler opposes human freedom in his writings. However, the very freedom he denies lingers as presuppositional dangler against him. The fact that he can never account for freedom does not illegitimize the fact of his presupposing freedom in word and deed. Zindler is in an epistemological box where matter in motion reigns and freedom lingers in an irreconcilable tension. And so we are left with either strict determinism that undermines ethics or ultimate irrationality of the relationship between determinism and freedom.
The Christian on the other hand has ultimate rationality behind the dialectical tension of freedom and determinism. As the creator of all things, God exits outside the laws of determinism because such laws are simply categorical distinction of the way God generally exercises His providence. He is not composed of, or governed by, such laws but is ultimately self determined and therefore also ultimately free. In the ontology of God, the two exist in ultimate rationality. God exercises his providence in such a way that neither his sovereignty nor human freedom is sacrificed. As God’s creature we will never fully know the relationship between freedom and determinism but the relationship does not exist in the realm of ultimate irrationality. Because of His “Godly” condition the relationship is fully known by Him and is therefore ultimate rationality.
It may be objected that the relationship between freedom and determinism can be said to exist simultaneously in “nature” and though we may never discover the details of that relationship it is ultimately rational in “nature”. The problem with this is that “nature” is no rational thing that exits. It is term used to identify the impersonal laws and matter of the universe. It can be said that nature is nothing more than the laws and matter of the universe understood corporately. Nature, being the impersonal set, cannot bring rationality to the relationships within the set. If “nature” is so defined as to incorporate freedom then the question must be, what is the identity of the relationship between freedom and law? Is such a relationship a universal? If so, it can be said to be a law. If we say that there is an impersonal law that governs the relationship between freedom and law, are we not just pushing the question of relationship to another level?
Another problem for Zindler is his inconsistent application of a fallacious “what is, is what ought to be” principle. His contention is the ethics “must be firmly planted in the soil of scientific self-knowledge.” (11) This self-knowledge seems to be the evolutionary nature of humans as being social animals who are happiest in the midst of happiness. (12) Based on his desire to plant his ethics in self knowledge, Zindler implements the principle of the “Enlightened Self-Interest” (13) which is to “maximize both the intensity and duration personal gratification” (14) by cooperating with others. Zindler’s ethic (“oughtness”) is determined by his perception of the human evolutionary condition (“isness”). In other words, we are by nature social animals and so ought to act socially.
When Zindler views “the rare psychopathic mutants among us who can be happy in the midst of a sad society” (15) he is unable to maintain his “is/ought” principle without undermining morals. What are morals? Are they not something toward which we should strive? If we are to strive toward moral rightness, as Zindler seems to want us to do in following the “Enlightened Self-Interest” (16) principle, then that would imply that we are presently not in the state of moral rightness. That is to say, our “is” is not were it “ought” to be. By Zindler’s own reckoning, the rare psychopathic mutant, who is antisocial and finds happiness in the midst of sadness, is who he is by nature. (17) By what principle does Zindler determine between two “is” states, which is the way things “ought” to be?
It seems that the “is/ought” principle is implemented by Zindler only when it supports his preconceived notions of the way things ought to be. One example of a smuggling of a preconceived notion is found in Zindler’s statement, “It is our nature, fortunately, to seek happiness…”. (1 I cannot help but notice that happiness seems to be a virtue prior to it being our nature. For would it not follow that if it was not our nature that Zindler would find this to beunfortunate? Why does he speak of seeking happiness in the midst of happiness as fortunately being our nature? If he were consistent with his world-view, then any state that we are in due to evolution or chemical reaction is just a state. There are no fortunate or unfortunate, virtuous or non-virtuous states, there are just states. Though not addressing moral issue directly, the words of Richard Taylor seem to be applicable on the issue:
The physical states of things, it would seem, just are, and one cannot even think of anything that could ever distinguish one such state from another as being either true or false. A physiologist might give a complete physical description of a brain and nervous system at a particular time, but he could never distinguish some of those states as true and others as false, nor would he have any idea what to look for if he were asked to do this. (19)
Returning to the “rare mutant” (21), is his state an unfortunate one? If so, why? Is it not the state that evolution has made him? This rare mutant may be further along in evolution than the most of us who seek happiness in the midst of happiness. How are we to know unless we already have some preconceived idea of the way things ought to be? Zindler, in arguing for morals from the way we are as a product of evolution, has rendered himself unable to make moral judgments on any individual, including himself, unless he arbitrarily places different moral values on different states, thereby undermining the “is/ought” principle. However, it is arbitrariness that Zindler wants to eliminate, “We cannot base our moral code upon the arbitrary and capricious fiats reported to us by persons claiming to be privy to the intentions of the denizens of Sinai or Olympus.” (21) Are we then, to follow the arbitrary fiat of Zindler as to which states are more morally correct than others? But if Zindler can arbitrarily decide, so too can his “rare mutant.” (22) We are left then with an absolute relativism of ethics, which is nothing less than the destruction of ethics.
It may be objected that Zindler is not acting arbitrarily in placing a higher value on happiness in the midst of happiness state than the happiness in the midst of sadness state but rather is making a judgment based upon the majority. Such objects not only conveniently set aside the “is/ought” principle but raises yet another question. What moral responsibility does the rare mutant have to the majority? Their happiness is not his concern. He is happy in their sadness! If majority determines the wrongness of the rare mutant then Zindler must abandon the notion of happiness as the ultimate engine of ethics and replace it with the notion of whatever the majority says, despite happiness (at least of the minority), is the engine. The attempt to maintain the happiness notion may be done by claiming that the majority, acting on that which provides the greatest happiness for them, enforces their standards on the “rare mutant” through might. This attempt steeps lower than “majority says” to “might says”. We need not ponder too long to conjure some creative and horrific ways that a minority can usurp the majority. Is this the road we really want to follow?
It is not our intention to fault Zindler for having some notion of the way things “ought” to be but only to demonstrate that his mechanistic, chemically determined world-view does not allow for “oughtness” and must be content with “isness”. The Christian world-view recognizes a difference between dialectical “is” and “ought”. God created human beings in His image to be vice regents of His world and to glorify Him by reflecting His character. We are His creatures and so are to be like Him. When our first parents disobeyed God, the image of God was marred. Our condition as human beings is one of fallen creatureliness and of a marred image of God. There is oughtness to our character because we are currently in a state that does not reflect the character of God the way in which we are intended. Zindler may dismiss this idea as being, “fictions concerning the nature of mankind” (23) but he must offer more than his own arbitrary assumptions of right and wrong states in order to avoid undermining morality.
Finally, we find that Zindler undermines his own notions of justice with his adherence to chemical determinism. According to Zindler, “Justice has its roots in the problem of determining fairness and reciprocity in cooperation.” (24) If one person helps another with tilling a cornfield, there is expected a fair compensation. When this compensation is met there is cooperation and maximized justice. When this compensation is withheld then there is no justice. Happiness is not maximized because though the farm owner may be happier now, he will not be able to find help in the future. By creating unhappiness for his current workers he creates unhappiness in his future. Granting that the farmer wants to maximize his happiness, he will probably compensate the workers. All of this we will grant for argument’s sake. (25)
Granting Zindler’s reasoning for justice, reciprocity, and cooperation, we can observe that such concepts imply personal identity. It is the “farmer” who hires the “worker” to till the field. The same “farmer” who hired the “worker” ought to compensate that same “worker”. This may all seem to be a given. However, Zindler is unable to account for personal identity with his evolutionary, mechanistic, and chemically determined universe. According to Zindler’s view a human being is a collection of the impersonal matter in motion and his brain is chemical states. Such chemical states determine behavior. So it can be argued that the “worker tilling” and the “worker sitting on the couch after work” are operating under radically different predetermined chemical states. If the bundle of chemicals that make up the “worker tilling” are radically different or are in a radically different relationship than the chemicals that make up “worker sitting”, can it not reasonably follow that the two are not necessarily the same personal identity? In Zindler’s world-view there can be no “I” behind the mask of changing chemical composition. Like Hume’s “successive perceptions” (26) the worker is nothing more than a succession of states. If “worker tilling” and “worker sitting” are not the same then to whom does the farmer owe compensation? The worker who worked for him no longer exists. To add further complication to the scenario, the “farmer after till” is not the same person who hired the worker. So after the tilling there is no farmer who owes and no worker who deserves. Justice, reciprocity, and cooperation are lost in the passing succession of personal identity. This may seem absurd, but such irrationality seems to be the implications of Zindler’s impersonal, mechanistic, and chemically determined universe.
Frank R. Zindler’s commitment to ultimate determinism has render ethics ultimately irrational. This is not to the fault of any scientific investigation he may have conducted. Indeed, the forces and laws that are the subject of his essay are genuine factors in human behavior and the work he has done in recognizing them is to the church’s benefit. For how much more awe inspiring is our God when we see that his providence encompasses both the complex social structure of our environment and the sub-atomic particles of our being while still assuring us personal identity, freedom, and direction in moral living.
NOTES:
1. Zindler, Frank R. “Ethics Without God”. Constructing a life Philosophy. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 2002. 162.
2. Ibid., 164.
3.Ibid., 164.
4. Ibid., 161, 162, 163.
5. Zindler “Ethics Without God” 161.
6. Zindler, Frank R. “Does God Exist” Radio Debate FM WMU7. Nov. 14, 1989. Transcript, John Sikos. Internet Infidels, 2002.
7. Zindler, Ethics Without God, 164.
8. Ibid., 167.
9. Ibid., 166.
10. Smart, J.J.C. “Materialism” Questions That Matter 2nd Edition. Ed. L. Miller. McGraw-Hill, 1998. 120.
Arguing against dualism J.J.C. Smart implemented the concept of a nomological “dangler” (from Herbert Feigl). By this he meant that the dualist must implement a law like concept of interaction between material and immaterial substances. Such a law dangles outside the normal set of laws of interaction that takes place only between physical objects.
11. Zindler, Ethics Without God, 166.
12. Zindler “Ethics Without God” 161.
13. Ibid., 167.
14. Ibid., 167.
15. Ibid., 161.
16. Ibid., 167.
17. Ibid., 161.
18. Ibid., 161.
19. Taylor, Richard. “Metaphysics” Questions That Matter 2nd Edition. Ed. L. Miller. McGraw-Hill, 1998, 124.
20. Zindler., “Ethics Without God,” 161.
21. Zindler, “Ethics Without God,” 166.
22. Ibid., 161.
23. Zindler, “Ethics Without God,” 166.
24. Ibid., 167.
25. There are some questions that could raised regarding any moral obligation for the farmer to seek to maximize his happiness.
26. Hume, David. “Treatise of Human Nature”. Questions That Matter. Ed. L. Miller. McGraw Hill, 1998, 189.
The annual Witnesses Now for Jesus Convention will begin tomorrow morning at 9am at the Blue Mountain Christian Retreat Center, New Ringgold PA. This event is free of charge and there is usually good teaching. The best part of these events is the fellowship - seeing people you usually only type at to over the keyboard.
